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noteworthy for his accounts of the success of a Paris-instigated cartel to fix output quotas,
sales territories, and prices between 1884 and 1902, and of the luck and skill required for
successful speculating and hedging in the Paris-dominated futures market for raw sugar.
Perhaps two broad themes emerge from the welter of detail: the port refineries' struggle
for survival against their advantaged Paris rivals; and the survivors' gradual evolution
from firms handicapped by artisanal techniques and family structures into modem big
businesses. The first theme is not fully developed; indeed, a book about the port refineries
with only passing reference to the Paris firms risks being Hamlet without the Prince. Nor
does Fierain make a serious attempt to fit his findings into our rapidly changing picture of
French industrialization as a whole. And he fails to tell us much about the place of the
refineries in the overall development of the port cities. No doubt these limitations merely
demonstrate again that model dissertations do not necessarily make model books. We
should be grateful to the Arno Press and the series editors for making such significant research available to more scholars.
REED GEIGER, Universityof Delaware

Les Agences regionales du Credit Lyonnais, annees 1870-1914. By Jacques Dagneau. Dissertations in European Economic History. New York: Arno Press, 1977. Pp. xx, 485; appendices. $45.00.
In 1961 Professor Jean Bouvier published the definitive study of the formative years of
the Credit Lyonnais, France's largest deposit bank. Jacques Dagneau's work-a these du
troisteme cycle presented at the Universite de Paris VIII in 1975-serves as a sequel to
Bouvier's in that it addresses the bank's development from 1882, where Bouvier stopped,
up to World War I. It is, however, a somewhat narrower work than Bouvier's. Eschewing
any attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the firm in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, it seeks instead to describe the operations of the network of
branch offices which the Credit Lyonnais launched in the 1870s. (Actually there were two
networks: the reseau regional in the southeast, directed from Lyon, and the reseau departemental which answered to Paris; Dagneau deals with branches in both networks under
the rubric agences regionales.)
The first part of Dagneau's work discusses the creation of the branch system and analyzes its revenues, expenses, and profits. The second part focuses on the masse des affaires
which includes the securities trade along with "ordinary" bank business. The third part
considers various facets of internal management (maintenance of liquidity, security, transfer of funds, and so on) as well as the personnel and personnel policies of the system.
Like many unrevised doctoral dissertations, Dagneau's study does little to tie its various
parts together, nor does it sufficiently relate them to a broader context. This necessarily
limits its appeal and usefulness for the general scholarly reader. Specialists in banking history, however, will welcome the mass of detailed information on the policies and practices
of the Credit Lyonnais at the turn of the century. Moreover, they will benefit from Dagneau's revisions of the prevailing wisdom on certain aspects of French financial history.
One of these concerns the notion that French banks encouraged capital export and, in
doing so, deprived domestic commerce and industry of needed funds between 1870 and
1914. Earlier, Bouvier had reinforced this view by showing that the Credit Lyonnais first
set up branch offices not to tap the meager profits offered by local banking, but rather to
drain idle capital from the provinces for investment in grosses affaires organized at Paris,
including foreign bond issues. Bouvier further showed that, in line with this strategy, the
predominant flow of capital within the Credit Lyonnais system was from the provinces to
Paris and through Paris to foreign borrowers in the 1870s and 1880s. Dagneau, however,
shows equally well that this pattern did not continue in the 1890s and 1900s, despite the
continuing taste of French investors for foreign paper (particularly Russian bonds).
Rather, because of Henri Germain's preoccupation with liquidity after the bank crisis of
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1882, the great bulk of the bank's deposits were invested domestically in the short-term
money market at the turn of the century. As a result, the direction of capital flow was reversed with funds collected in Paris increasingly going to the periphery. Dagneau also
shows that, as part of this trend, involvement with domestic industry-long shunned by
the bank after the fiascos of the 1860s and 1870s-was again on the rise before World War
I as seen in the Credit Lyonnais' participation in a major stock issue by the Schneiders in
1913 (p. 243). If the experience of the Credit Lyonnais is at all typical, one must conclude
from Dagneau's evidence that the export of capital played a relatively minor role in the
financial life of France in thefin de siecle, and that the French banking system was much
more responsive to the needs of the French economy in this period than is usually
thought.
MICHAEL S. SMITH, Universityof South Carolina

La Politique des grands travaux en France, 1929-1939: Grands travaux et investissements
publics des ann~es trente dans la tradition administrativefranfaise. By Pierre Saly. Dissertations in European Economic History. New York: Arno Press, 1977. Pp. 601. $27.00.
The subtitle of this book is more revealing of its contents than the main title, and the
allusion to the "French administrative tradition" particularly instructive. Saly's study
could very well be classed as institutional history with a dynamic dimension. Not only has
he identified and ordered the various bodies-parliamentary, administrative, fiscal, and
other-which participated in defining and executing French public investment policy between the two wars, but more importantly, and more subtly, he has identified and charted
the actual flows of funds involved. This enabled him to compare rhetoric and appearances
with fiscal reality, and led to some interesting, not to say disabused conclusions.
Saly raised the question as to whether Keynes' full employment theory had any effect
on French practice in the 1930s, only to answer, artfully but conclusively, by demonstrating the immense continuity of the French tradition of state-subsidized "works" to absorb
unemployment and to improve the country's economic infrastructure. If Keynes had any
impact on French fiscal or budget planning policy, whether at the unconscious level of
policy assumptions or the official level of public rhetoric, it was later, and certainly after
World War II. The origins of French public investment between the two World Wars were
different, and threefold: traditional spending to counter unemployment, reconstruction of
the regions devastated during World War I, and "modernization."
The French administrative tradition of coping with unemployment through public
spending goes back to the Old Regime and its "ateliers de charity." But it was not until the
Constituante (1791) that providing work for the unemployed was subordinated to the definition and execution of a coherent plan of national public works. The nineteenth century
was subsequently marked by a series of great "plans." The Second Empire had its railroads and its great public buildings. The beginnings of the.Third Republic were marked
by the "Freycinet Plan," which substantially completed France's railroad network. At the
turn of the century, a new preoccupation arose, that of combating unemployment resulting from movements in the business cycle with specifically countercyclical investment outlays. In addition to the problem of dealing with the business cycle, there was a growing
realization in the economy, the administration, and wider circles of public opinion that the
country's infrastructure (transportation, electrification, communications) was not keeping
pace with that of its rivals, in particular those symbols of industrialism and modernism,
Germany and the United States.
These considerations, at first interrupted by the First World War, were then supplanted
for a time by the urgency of postwar reconstruction. Yet, as Saly points out, the management and application of reconstruction funds, in particular reparation payments, were in
fact largely governed by the objectives of maintaining employment and modernizing the
country. For Saly, indeed, the origins of the Tardieu program (1929) are to be found in the

